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''An Imaginary Negro in an Impossible Place"?
THE ISSUE OF NEW MEXICO STATEHOOD IN THE
SECESSION CRISIS, 1860-1861

Mark

J.

Stegmaier

F

or decades U.S. history professors have quoted the phrase, "an imaginary Negro in an impossible place," to indicate that the arid climate
and rugged geography of the American West likely would have blocked the
spread of southern slavery into the region's federal territories following the
end of the U.S.-Mexico War in 1848. Few historians know that the quotation
originated in James G. Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to
Garfield, a memoir published in two volumes in the mid-188os. Blaine used
the phrase, which he attributed to a "witty representative from the South,"
in a chapter on the U.S. Congress during the secession winter of 1860-1861.
Blaine dated neither when the expression came into the political discourse
nor when he learned it from his southern informant. The phrase, as quoted
by Blaine, may have derived from similar expressions used in the telegraphic
dispatches of a Washington, D.C., correspondent to the Philadelphia Inquirer in early 1861. In one letter, this correspondent mentioned "a hypothetical darkey in an imaginary territory" and, in a later one, "an imaginary
negro in a hypothetical Territory." The correspondent made no specific reference to New Mexico in either dispatch, and Blaine's own reference was to
the entire West, but that winter, the principal geographic focus of the
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congressional debate over slavery in the western territories was the region
below the old Missouri Compromise line oflatitude 36°30' north-an area
embraced entirely by New Mexico Territory.
Few New Mexicans today are aware that a proposal to admit New Mexico
immediately to statehood, with or without slavery, became a significant part
of final political compromise attempted to resolve peacefully the secession
crisis or, at least, to retain the loyalty of the border slave states in the Union.
This article will attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the congressional struggle over the New Mexico statehood bill, the persons behind
the measure, the political and public reactions to it, the action of New
Mexico's politicians themselves on the proposal, and the role that the bill
played in the overall secession crisis.]
The issue of New Mexico statehood was old news by the winter of 18601861. Almost from the formal acquisition of this southwestern region at the
end of the U.S.-Mexico War, proposals for the admission of New Mexico as
a state had become the subject of heated congressional debate. All this attention to a vast desert region with a tiny Anglo-Saxon population was relevant to the conflict between the North and South over whether Congress
could or should ban slavery in the federal territories of the American West.
The logical solution occurring to some members, even at the conflict's beginning, was to admit immediately the territories of California and New
Mexico as states. This approach would, in effect, bypass the volatile constitutional issue of whether Southerners had a right to take slave property into
national territories or whether Northerners had a right to ban slavery from
them. No one doubted the right of sovereign people, when framing a state
constitution, to decide whether they would allow or ban slavery. During the
first year of his administration, Pres. Zachary Taylor pushed for immediate
California and New Mexico statehood, but after he died in July 1850, Congress and his successor, Pres. Millard Fillmore, gave New Mexico territorial
status as part of the Compromise of 1850.2
New Mexico remained a federal territory during the 185os. Its governors
were mostly Democrats appointed by presidents Franklin Pierce and James
Buchanan. The population was estimated at just over ninety thousand, about
half of whom were Navajo, Comanche, Apache, and Pueblo Indians. The
Hispanic population numbered about fifty thousand; all but a thousand were
poor peons, or servants for debt. Two groups constituted the Anglo Americans: less than a thousand emigrants from the eastern states and some three
thousand U.S. Army troops. The single most dominant religious and social
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institution was the Roman Catholic Church, to which nearly all the Hispanic population adhered. There were probably less than twenty black slaves,
and all were the house servants of army officers or federal officials posted to
New Mexico. The economy depended largely on cattle and sheep raising
and on the Santa Fe trade, especially with Missouri. New Mexicans also
grew corn and wheat, some of which they sold to the army, and mined some
copper and gold, and traded with the nomadic Indians. The constant threat
of raids by many of these same tribes, particularly the Navajos, however,
greatly hindered economic development and severely strained the army's
resources. Without any legal authority, Hispanos held several hundred Indian captives as slaves, although no one in Washington, D.C., appeared to
take notice of the practice. In the late 185os, the New Mexico Territorial
Legislature tried to give legal recognition to Indian slavery, but Gov. Abraham
Rencher disallowed the law, declaring that freedom would remain the official natural state of the territory's Native Americans.
Political power in the region radiated outward from Santa Fe, the territorial capital and the largest town in New Mexico. The president appointed the
governor and other territorial officials to the territorial executive department,
but the citizenry, including peons, elected members to the Legislative Council or upper house and to the House of Representatives or lower house. During the 185os, while Anglo Americans dominated the territorial administration,
Mexican Americans occupied many seats and exercised considerable power
in the legislature. Legislative proceedings were conducted in Spanish, although
the legislative records and statutes were published in companion Spanish and
English editions. Obviously, Spanish-language fluency was a prime requisite
for Anglos with political aspirations in New Mexico. The authority of the
government in Santa Fe, however, was severely limited by the vastness of the
territory, poor communications, and meager resources. Not only did the settlers in the Tucson area petition the federal government for years for a separate territory of Arizona, but the New Mexico Territorial Legislature itself
petitioned the U.S. Congress in support of their request in 1860. 3
In 1859 the territorial legislature in Santa Fe enacted a slave code to
build up southern support in Congress for legislation beneficial to the territory. The fact that New Mexico already possessed a slave code brought the
territory to the attention of compromisers seeking to keep the slave states
from seceding from the Union. The most prominent compromise proposal,
that of Kentucky senator John J. Crittenden, included a constitutional
amendment that would divide all western territories (those already possessed
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and any thereafter acquired) at the Missouri Compromise line, with slavery
protected in territories organized below it. 4
The big question was what concessions, if any, the Republicans in Congress would be willing to make and whether those measures would go far
enough to persuade most slave states to remain in the Union. In letters to
Republican congressional members, President-elect Abraham Lincoln made
clear that he wanted no compromise on slavery in the territories. Allowing
slavery in the West might open the door to a new southern slave empire in
Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean. Reluctant to compromise in
any fashion, most congressional Republicans believed that their party had
won the election of 1860 in regular, constitutional fashion and had the right
to take power on 4 March 1861, without making concessions to the South.
Republicans, however, could not simply ignore the dire political situation. In particular they had to retain the loyalty of as many border slave
states, such as Kentucky and Maryland, as possible by the time of Lincoln's
inauguration on 4 March 1861. Congressional representatives from those
Upper South states, along with most northern Democrats, greatly preferred
Crittenden's constitutional amendments, which no Republican in Congress
could endorse. In response some Republicans sought an alternative that
would reflect their party's platform, project Republican amity to the Upper
South states, and confirm the protection of slavery in the southern states. At
this point, border-state Unionists needed encouragement to fight the secessionist hysteria about the "abolitionist" intentions of the Republicans. 5
Compromisers advanced a number of measures intended to mollify the
Border States. One was a constitutional amendment that would prohibit
Congress from interfering with or abolishing slavery in the states. During
and after the election of 1860, Republican politicians had pledged to leave
slavery untouched in southern states. The special House Committee of
Thirty-three, formed in an attempt to prevent secession and chaired by
Thomas Corwin, a Republican from Ohio, devised such a constitutional
amendment, which became known as the Corwin Amendment. Another
compromise advanced by a few Republicans to soothe the border slave states
and avoid Crittenden's or similar territorial compromises promoted the
immediate admission of New Mexico as a state, with or without slavery as
its citizens chose when they drafted their state constitution. One charm of
this measure was that the act that had established New Mexico Territory in
1850 already provided for a plebiscite on the slavery question there. Dividing unorganized western lands then possessed by the United States and
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admitting the new territories as states was the object of several compromise
plans introduced early in the session. 6
The House bill enabling New Mexico statehood generated far more interest and controversy than any other territory-to-statehood proposal. The
measure originated in the Committee of Thirty-three on 20 December 1860,
when committee member Henry Winter Davis, Maryland's leading American (Know-Nothing) Party member and unconditional Unionist, suddenly
"broke in with a cannon shot clear through the line" by proposing to admit
the entire territory south oflatitude 36°30' north-New Mexico Territoryas a state. Stunned Southerners on the committee declared their opposition, pressing instead for a formula based on the Crittenden Compromise
already debated in committee.
Davis sought an influential political ally on the committee to aid his
proposal. The next morning, during a carriage ride to the Capitol, Davis
pitched his argument for New Mexico statehood to Charles Francis Adams,
a Republican representative from Massachusetts. Davis believed that the
plan would split off the border slave states from the Deep South, for rejection by the cotton states would demonstrate the hollowness of their invocation of the Missouri Compromise line. House members from the Deep
South were holding out for a concession on the status offuture territories, a
matter of little practical relevance to states such as Maryland and Virginia.
Republican support for New Mexico statehood, even if it chose to be a slave
state, would impress the border slave states with the honesty and earnestness of the often-stated Republican promise not to meddle in slavery in the
southern states. New Mexico was the only federal territory where the slavery debate held any pot~ntial practical relevance, and its elevation to statehood would remove from political debate the incessant contention over
slavery in the western territories.
Impressed by Davis's argument, Adams concluded that the Republicans
might wisely adopt the program. Also attractive to Adams was that New
Mexico's uneven northern boundary would discourage establishing a solid
line to the Pacific Ocean separating slave and free territory in the West
(map 1). In committee that day, Davis formally introduced his proposals,
which included New Mexico statehoodJ
Davis desperately wanted to originate a political solution that would confirm his reputation as a Union-saver or at least as the man who saved the
border slave states for the Union. As a member of the Know-Nothing or
American Party, he had favored the Constitutional Union Party ticket of

MAP 1. NEW MEXICO
TERRITORY, WITH
THE "NOTCH," IN

18 57
(Map courtesy Fray
Angelico Chavez
Historical Library,
Palace of the
Governors, Museum
of New Mexico,
Santa Fe)
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John Bell and Edward Everett in the recent presidential election. Many
acquaintances admired his personal charm, boldness, and oratorical skills,
but most Southerners repudiated him as a turncoat for cozying up to the
Republicans in Congress. Davis's vote in 1860 had clinched the office of
House Speaker for moderate Republican William Pennington of New Jersey, who then selected Davis to be Maryland's representative on the Committee ofThirty-three. On the committee, Davis worked assiduously to devise
solutions, including New Mexico statehood, to win Republican votes.
The inspiration for Davis's New Mexico proposition may have been resolutions offered in the House by Rep. John Sherman, a Republican from
Ohio, on 12 December 1860 and referred to the Committee of Thirty-three.
Sherman recommended that Congress immediately divide the remaining
unorganized western territory into entities of convenient size and admit them
as states. If a staunch Republican such as Sherman could propose such a
measure, could New Mexico statehood secure enough Republican support
for passage? Davis's Unionism apparently trumped his anti-Catholic nativism,
a Know-Nothing calling card; he would willingly grant immediate statehood to New Mexico, a territory dominated by Catholics of Mexican and
Indian descent. Some Republicans, like Adams, on the Committee of
Thirty-three, believed that accommodating Davis would demonstrate Republican
goodwill toward the border slave states.
These men understood that Davis's unconditional Unionism was a grave political risk in Maryland and that he needed
to show his constituents positive results.
Many people and most newspapers in his
Baltimore district had condemned Davis's
selection for the committee as unrepresentative of Maryland's views. Although
congressional Republicans might consider Davis their favorite Southerner, the
small Republican group in Baltimore disdained him for his bullying of them. 8
The proposal to raise New Mexico to
statehood in the secession winter was MIGUEL A. OTERO, SR., CA. 1881
hatched by Davis on his own. Neither (Photograph courtesy Los Alamos
politicians in New Mexico Territory nor Nuclear Laboratory)
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its territorial delegate in the U.S. House-the wealthy, young, dynamic
Democrat Miguel A. Otero-had urged Davis to bring forward this measure. Ironically, the New Mexico Territorial Legislature was coincidentally
considering, in its annual session, a parallel measure to hold a statehood
convention in Santa Fe in 1861. The bill's origin and rationale are obscure.
Otero may have recognized, after the adjournment of the previous U.S.
congressional session, that an opportunity to secure statehood for New
Mexico might arise during the turmoil of the post-election session. Upon
returning to New Mexico between sessions, Otero may have counseled some
territorial legislators to propose such a bill and prepare the territory to hold
a statehood convention if the circumstances in Washington favored one.
His political ally James L. Collins, editor of the Santa Fe Gazette, strongly
favored the bill and lauded the benefits of statehood in his columns.9
On 7 January 1861 Sydney Hubbell, representing Bernalillo and Santa
Ana counties in New Mexico, introduced the statehood convention bill in
the Legislative Council. Mter deliberations and some amendments, the
council passed the bill 6-5, eleven days later. Elections in May would choose
delegates to a statehood convention in June; New Mexicans would ratify or
reject the constitution in the regular October elections. The New Mexico
House of Representatives took up the bill on 21 January and, three days
later, referred it to a special committee for consideration. Some dissenters
wanted a popular referendum on the convention bill itself. The opponents
to the bill were primarily concerned about the increased tax burden that
statehood would impose on New Mexico-New Mexicans were passionately opposed to new taxes-but also may have doubted the ability of the
Santa Fe government to administer the vast new state. The House took no
further action on the bill before the session ended on 31 January. In the
East, however, many observers misinterpreted reports of the Legislative
Council's action as approval of the statehood-convention bill by the legislature as a whole. 1O
In Washington, D.C., during a week-long recess for the Christmas holidays, the Republican members on the Committee of Thirty-three met to
discuss Davis's New Mexico-statehood proposal. After South Carolina seceded on 20 December 1860 and other cotton states prepared to do the
same, congressional Republicans stiffened their opposition to compromise
with "traitors." But among the proposals before the special committee, its
Republican members generally liked Davis's idea best, for they could argue
that supporting New Mexico statehood would not surrender their party's
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pledge to oppose slavery in the national territories. On Christmas Day, the
committee Republicans met in Chairman Corwin's room at Willard's Hotel. For five hours, they interviewed John S. Watts, a former federal judge
and New Mexico's delegate-elect, who had lived in New Mexico for nine
years. Amid questioning about the territory's soil, climate, produce, resources,
and population, Watts explained the impossibility of southern slavery ever
taking hold as a labor system in the region's "barren" landscape. The next
day, the Republicans conferred again, and Corwin proposed that the committee Republicans offer two measures to the Committee of Thirty-three:
the constitutional amendment on congressional noninterference with slavery in the states; and a bill to provide for New Mexico statehood, with or
without slavery as its citizens decided. ll
After a majority in the room agreed, Corwin asked Adams whether he
would bring the two measures before the committee. The ever-jolly Corwin
affectionately referred to Adams, considered a radical Republican, as "the
Archbishop of antislavery." A level-headed moderate Republican, Corwin
obviously believed that two compromise measures drawn up and introduced
by a radical of famous lineage would attract more attention to and support
for them than otherwise. At first refusing the task, Adams anticipated that
authoring the amendment and bill would open him to the charge of weakening his resolve in the face of southern threats and sacrificing Republican
principles to satisfy the "Slave Power." The insistence of his Republican
committee colleagues, however, wore down Adams, who reluctantly agreed
to draft the measures in faint hope of resolving the crisis. He wrote in his
diary, "If the current of revolution could be slackened by any sacrifice of
myself it would be but gain."12
Rumors alone of Adams's role agitated politicians on both sides. Republicans on the Senate's special Committee of Thirteen quickly objected to
Adams's proposing that the Committee of Thirty-three draft a New Mexico
enabling bill. Sen. Jacob Collamer ofVermont warned that Adams's Massachusetts district would never reelect him ifhe offered the New Mexico bill.
Adams delayed until the Republican members of the House and Senate
special committees could caucus to discuss the matter. He did, however,
present the House committee a resolution in favor of the constitutional
amendment on 28 December.
The next day, the Republicans of the House and Senate committees consulted. Offour senators present, only the radical senator Benjamin Wade of
Ohio spoke adamantly against any compromise, while the other three chose
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to press no objections. Later that day, encouraged by House members, Adams
offered his resolution declaring that it was "expedient" to admit New Mexico,
including the Arizona region, as a state and that the committee should draft
an enabling bill for this purpose. Rep. Cadwallader C. Washburn, a Republican from Wisconsin, immediately denounced the measure as bald-faced
southern appeasement that would add two proslavery votes to the U.S. Senate from a new state with only an estimated seven hundred native whites in
its population.
Adams's resolution passed but not overwhelmingly. With some southern
members from cotton states no longer attending, the Committee of Thirtythree adopted the proposal 13-11. The Republicans split 9-5 in favor of the
measure, while Southerners divided 5-2 against it. The two slave-state supporters were Francis Bristow of Kentucky and Davis of Maryland, both KnowNothing members. Bristow later informed Adams in private that he had
voted for the resolution only to reciprocate the conciliatory spirit in which
he had offered it. Bristow believed that New Mexico statehood was no concession and that Kentuckians would interpret the move as an intentional
insult to them. Other Southerners on the committee adamantly demanded
a compromise explicitly recognizing the right of southern slaveholders to
carry slave property into national territories then held or thereafter acquired.
To them New Mexico statehood was merely a Republican "dodge" to avoid
the territorial-slavery question. Following the vote, the committee removed
the rule of secrecy from their proceedings of the previous two daysY
Adams's resolution certainly was a dodge, but he had no intention of
insulting the Kentuckians or any other Southerners. As he explained in a
letter to his son Charles JI. on 30 December, he knew that his plan would
not stop the Deep South's secessionist course. Secessionist leaders were struggling to control federal policy in the interests of slavery "forever." Attempting to mollify the Border States, Adams wanted them at least to believe that
they could comfortably remain in a Union controlled by a Republican administration. His two-pronged plan of a constitutional amendment pledging congressional noninterference with slavery in the southern states and a
bill to sidestep the territorial-slavery issue by immediately admitting New
Mexico to statehood, even with slavery if the territory so chose, constituted
the nearest approach made by Republicans toward an overall settlement of
the main divisive issues in the secession winteI. I4
Adams, of course, anticipated resistance by many Republicans to his
scheme. Some Republicans, however, acquiesced, albeit unenthusiastically,
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to his proposal out of respect for Adams. One of the most positive reactions
came from William S. Messervy, former territorial secretary and congressional delegate for New Mexico. Messervy assured Adams that the North
lost nothing by his proposal and that under the influence of the incoming
Republican administration, the merely nominal proslavery character of New
Mexico would vanish. Most Republicans were shocked, however, when they
read about Adams's maneuver, especially in regard to New Mexico, in the
newspapers. They were extremely critical of New Mexico, its slave code,
and its possible admission to the Union as a slave state, particularly under
the guiding hand of the supposedly antislavery Republican Adams. They
labeled the New Mexico proposal a shame and disgrace and accused Adams
of deserting Republican principles and surrendering to the insolent demands
ofthe "Slave Power." The New Mexico issue severely strained Adams's friendship with Massachusetts senator and fellow Republican Charles Sumner,
who began referring to Adams as one of the "Ishmaelites," or outcasts, of the
North. The most radical critics, such as abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, believed that Adams's measure might actually consign New Mexico to
permanent slavery, and some cynics predicted New Mexico secession upon
attaining statehood. 15
The New Mexico issue split even Adams's family. His son Henry, serving
as his father's secretary, defended the Davis-Adams proposal in unsigned
letters to the Boston Advertiser. He argued for the New Mexico plan as a
necessary gesture of goodwill by Republicans toward the Border States and
as a practical Republican policy alternative to the southern ultimatum for
the absolute guarantee of slavery in the territories articulated in the
Crittenden Compromise. But Adams's sons Charles JI. and John in Boston
became so angry that they considered engaging Faneuil Hall, the site of
speeches by Samuel Adams, James Otis, and others advocating American
independence from England in the late eighteenth century, to denounce their
father's action in public. On 28 December, in a letter to his father, Charles JI.
labeled Davis a "sorcerer" who had "beguiled" the elder Adams and railed
against the proposition as "the most ingeniously bad one ever made" and as
"cutting off the march of free soil toward the Gulf & consecrating Mexico
forever to slavery." That same day, Charles JI. explained to his mother,
Abigail: "Some of our friends purse their lips determinedly, & say fiercely if
Mr. Adams is for it [New Mexico statehood] it must be right. ... Others
look black & scowl at me & others mildly wonder if there's no such thing
as sending a firm man to Congress." Luckily for the family's harmony,
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Massachusetts governor John Andrew returned just then to Boston from
Washington, D.C., where Charles Sr. had convinced him of the efficacy of
New Mexico statehood. A conversation with Andrew, a noted radical Republican himself, greatly cheered Charles Jr. The next day, he wrote his
father to pledge his support, although he still believed that the New Mexico
plan was politically risky for him. 16
Radical Republican newspapers vigorously condemned Adams's movenone more ardently than Horace Greeley's New York Tribune. In 1849 as a
member of the U.S. House from New York and in 1850 as editor of the
Tribune, Greeley had defended New Mexico against the Texas claim to all
its lands east of the Rio Grande, argued against slavery in the territory, and
supported its early bid for statehood. Although the campaign for New Mexico
statehood in 1849 had been a free-soil tactic to prevent slavery extension,
Greeley now interpreted Adams's plan in 1860-1861 as an attempt to admit
New Mexico as a slave stateY
In seven editorials during the session, Greeley tried to show that New
Mexico was totally unworthy of statehood and that, if granted that status, it
would be a slave state. In his view, Democratic presidential administrations
since 1853 had fostered the establishment of slavery there; the result was the
territorial slave code of 1859. Aiding Democratic officials in New Mexico,
Greeley wrote, were "the scum of Southern rascaldom" expelled from California by the San Francisco Vigilance Committee and "platoons" of former
Missouri "Border Ruffians" ousted from Kansas by the free-soilers. New
Mexico's native inhabitants, Greeley described, were a "hybrid race" of
Spanish-Indian origin. These quasi-enslaved peons, "ignorant and degraded,
demoralized and priest-ridden," were mere tools of the unscrupulous men
who had enacted "the most cruel, mean and barbarous Slave-code" in the
Western Hemisphere. However much of New Mexico was an arid and "barren" region, the mines in its Arizona sector would attract still more slave
labor. The New Mexico state, with its slavery, would open the way for the
South to invade and conquer Mexico, thus laying the foundation for future
sectional contention and possible civil war. Greeley recommended that
Congress delay New Mexico statehood at least for several years while new
Republican appointees moved local attitudes toward Republican principles
of freedom in the region. 18
More personally hurtful to Adams and potentially more damaging to his
political career than Greeley's editorials was Edward L. Pierce's opposition.
An antislavery Republican, he was not only a close friend of fellow radicals
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Gov. Salmon P. Chase of Ohio and Senator Sumner but also the secretary
of the party's state central committee in Massachusetts. He had helped
Adams's election to his congressional seat in 1858 and could aid or hinder
his reelection bid in 1862. On 29 December 1860, Pierce wrote Adams to
condemn the New Mexico statehood plan as a gross abandonment of the
Republican commitment to free territories and the admission of new free
states. He worried that New Mexico might really become a slave state. On 1
January 1861, Adams countered that his offer of New Mexico statehood flowed
from "an unrepealed and unrescinded contract" with the territory for admission when its people chose. The Republicans, Adams wrote, were now
willing to grant statehood and to let the South take its chances. Under no
circumstance would Republicans agree to the Crittenden formula of protecting slavery in southern territory "hereafter acquired." He also pointed
out to Pierce that the Southerners opposed his idea because they feared
New Mexico would become a free state unless the future protection of slavery was securely imposed on the region. In a letter to Sumner, Pierce excoriated Adams's argument about an "unrescinded contract" as "trivial to the
last degree." "For shame!" he wrote. 19
Pierce went to the public with his critique of Adams's propositions. On
the advice of abolitionist Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, Pierce struck out all
kind sentiments toward Adams in an unsigned essay that he published in
Boston's Atlas and Bee on 9 January 1861. Appearing on the front page,
Pierce's article described Adams's measures as "submitting to terrorism" and
"parleying with treason" and warned that they would "compromise the integrity" of Republican principles and bind new generations to constitutional
guarantees for slavery in perpetuity. Pierce repeated an erroneous charge,
originally made in a letter to Sumner, that Adams's constitutional amendment would place the word "slave" in the Constitution. Despite Adams's
assurances, New Mexico, Pierce worried, still might choose slavery: it had a
slave code and debt peonage legally in place. No Republican press operated
there to educate an ignorant and pliable population in antislavery principles,
and influential slaveholding capitalists in New Mexico might successfully
subvert Lincoln's Republican appointees into winking at slavery and peonage. New Mexicans must repeal the slave code, Pierce demanded, to ensure
that their territory would be free in statehood.
Pierce also attacked another justification for the Davis-Adams compromise package. The New Mexico statehood plan, he argued, had no practical relevance to retaining border slave states in the Union. The "odious"
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New Mexico slave code, evidence of southern proslavery aggression, had
gained more votes for the Republicans in the Democratic stronghold of
"Egypt," or southern Illinois, in the recent election than had any other political issue. Yet Adams would now condone slavery's extension to New
Mexico, which Republicans had agreed collectively to oppose. Contained
in Pierce's fierce critique was a veiled threat to Adams's reelection. He pointed
out that in 1860, the Republican Party had rejected Rep. Eli Thayer of
Massachusetts after he failed to tow the line of party orthodoxy. Pierce reminded Adams that no statesman in his storied family had won fame by
resorting to compromise. Invoking Lincoln, Pierce concluded his piece by
quoting a long antislavery passage from the president-elect's influential
Cooper Union speech delivered in February 1860. 20
Congressman Adams found himself increasingly besieged on all sides.
His fellow Republicans in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere gave lukewarm
support at best to New Mexico statehood; most were severely or mildly critical. Extremist Southerners saw Adams's step as a Republican trick to bring a
new free state into the Union. Even most border slave-state moderates,
Adams's target group, were unenthused, instead desiring Republicans to
adopt the Crittenden Compromise, which made a constitutional concession to them on the issue of slavery in national territories. The admission of
New Mexico, only nominally a slaveholding territory, into the Union was
sidestepping that issue.
On 8 January, the frustrated Adams shook up the deliberations. He announced that he would oppose any majority report issued by the Committee of Thirty-three unless the Southerners on the committee assented to or
at least expressed their views on a resolution that he had introduced in committee that day. "Peaceful acquiescence" in the recent presidential election, Adams declared in the measure, was "the paramount duty" of all good
U.S. citizens. The resolution was a "loaded" challenge designed by Adams
to release him from voting for his own constitutional amendment and especially his New Mexico statehood bill, both of which were unpopular among
his Massachusetts constituents. He knew very well that in the vitriolic, explosive atmosphere of the secession crisis, almost no Southerner on the
committee would commit himself to the resolution's unconditional unionism. Indeed, southern members withheld their vocal assent.
Three days later, on a motion introduced by Rep. John S. Millson of
Virginia, they successfully watered down Adams's resolution. They substituted "high and imperative" for "paramount" before the committee passed

SPRING 2009

STEGMAIER ~

277

the nonbinding measure. Seven slave-state members refused to vote on the
resolution in any form. Later that day, as Adams had promised three days
earlier, he voted nay on both of his measures, joining four other Republicans against the constitutional amendment and eight other Republicans
against the New Mexico enabling bill. While most Republican members
voted for the amendment, only five, including Corwin, voted for the New
Mexico bill. Despite Republican opposition, the committee approved the
amendment 20-5 and the New Mexico bill 14-9; all non-Republicans who
voted in committee cast their support for the two proposals. The New Mexico
bill provided for the election of delegates on 5 August, a statehood convention in Santa Fe on 2 September, and a ratification vote for the new constitution on 4 November. However, neither of Adams's twei measures nor two
others before the committee produced a convincing majority.
The committee decided that its chairman, Representative Corwin, should
report all four measures to the House as its majority report. At Corwin's
behest, Adams wrote the New Mexico part of this report, but he then submitted one of the seven minority reports dissenting from the committee
measures, although he included no New Mexico material in his account.
In his mind, the southern refusal to accept the Republican offers tarred the
compromise process with futility. Adams's turnabout-his "tergiversation"
as newspaperman Horace White called it-on the New Mexico bill satisfied neither its radical abolitionist critics nor its southern Unionist supporters. Abolitionist and women's rights advocate Lydia Maria Child sneered to
Senator Sumner, "He [Adams] recants because our masters will not condescend to accept the liberal offer," but Virginia Unionist William C. Rives
lamented that Adams's opposition to the majority report showed how leading politicians cared more for personal consistency than the good of the
country.21
During January and February 1861, as additional southern states seceded,
Congress debated all sorts of solutions and measures that most legislators
hoped would prevent secession by the border slave states. Among these
packages was the principal Republicancsponsored proposal on the slavery
issue in the West, the House Committee of Thirty-three's bill enabling
New Mexico statehood. When Representative Sherman of Ohio had
brought upthe New Mexico statehood plan before'a. caucus of congressmen from northern and southern border states during the first week in
January, the caucus rejected it along with several other suggested proposals. Most Republicans in Congress, however, turned against it and all other
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compromise measures, their attitudes hardening against any idea that
hinted at concession to "traitors."22
Toward the end ofJanuary, as secession became a reality across the South,
the New Mexico enabling bill enjoyed a resurgence of interest among Republicans. One major catalyst was the arrival of Kentucky's antislavery Republican (one of few in the slave states) Cassius M. Clay in Washington,
D.C. Many Kentuckians, even Democratic governor Beriah Magoffin and
other Clay enemies, had requested that he make this diplomatic journey.
Most Kentuckians were desperate for any congressional compromise that
would hold their border state in the Union. Although Kentuckians preferred
the Crittenden Compromise, they realized that it stood no chance of approval by a Republican-dominated Congress. The Corwin committee's
amendment and bills, including New Mexico statehood, did appear to have
some chance for passage. Clay was the perfect Kentucky emissary to lobby
his fellow Republicans for setting aside their earlier misgivings and voting
for the committee measures.
Clay intended to push particularly for the passage ofAdams's New Mexico
proposal. Tirelessly engaging in conferences with Senate and House members (especially the latter), he argued that the New Mexico enabling bill
would satisfy Kentucky by bringing the intractable territorial slavery issue to
an end honorable to all and with no sacrifice of principle by the Republicans. Dropping their strict opposition to even the remote possibility of slavery in a New Mexico state, Clay declared to Republicans, was a small price
to pay for Kentucky's continued loyalty. On 23 January, he buttonholed
Adams on the House floor and begged him to resume support for the committee measures. Clay promised Kentucky's wholehearted support for them,
and Adams, earlier foiled by southern opposition, pledged his support and
told Clay which House Republicans to press.
On the night of 26 January, Clay delivered a rousing speech that advocated New Mexico statehood to a Republican club at the Odd Fellows Hall
in Washington, D.C. Despite disdain expressed by the radical members in
the audience, he initially believed that his efforts were making headway
among the moderate Republicans. However, the political tide began running against him in early February, when the Peace Conference, sponsored
by Virginia's legislature to devise a compromise plan, began its sessions in
the capital. (Most states sent delegates to this meeting.) Conference proponents wanted to push the Crittenden Compromise or a measure very close
to it. To dodge maki\lg a decision on New Mexico statehood, Republicans
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wary of any compromise lapsed into nonaction, claiming that they wanted
to take no action that might conflict with the Peace Conference's efforts to
achieve an overall settlement. Corwin followed suit by not pressing for votes
on his committee's measures.z'
Ironically, the possibility that the Washington Peace Conference might
produce a territorial compromise that Republicans would reject as obnoxious to their principles kept alive their interest in New Mexico statehood,
under its 1850 formula "with or without slavery," as a political fallback. They
preferred, however, to delay any compromise settlement until the Lincoln
administration took office; any settlement made before 4 March, in their
eyes, was a bribe to their secessionist enemies to ensure that their legally
elected president assumed the chief magistracy. Republicans, however, also
wanted to keep their options open, and New Mexico statehood was their
trump card. In his House address on 31 January Adams, probably influenced
somewhat by Clay's pleas, returned to a position generally supportive of the
Committee of Thirty-three measures. New Mexico, he opined, would inevitably become a free state, but he also reminded his listeners that the
committee had been willing to admit New Mexico to statehood, even with
slavery, as a final resolution to the sectional controversy over the territories.
A week later, Representative Davis praised Adams's New Mexico bill as evidence of Republican liberality on the-territories. On 1 February, signaling
his acquiescence to the measure, President-elect Lincoln in Springfield,
Illinois, wrote Sen. William Seward of New York that he did not care much
about New Mexico, "if further extension were hedged against."
Throughout February New Mexico statehood still occupied an ambivalent position in the political dialogue. Despite the Peace Conference, some
editorials in Republican newspapers began advocating the Adams bill, and
some Washington, D.C., correspondents detected a shift by some House
Republicans in that direction. The New Mexico statehood bill's most ardent champions in February were New York Times editor Henry J. Raymond
and his principal Washington, D.C., correspondent, who wrote under the
pseudonym, "Observer." From late January to late February, however, most
House Republicans declared against the New Mexico statehood bill. Of
, thirty-three Republican speeches, only ten congressmen defended the New
Mexico bill while twenty-three others assailed it. Still opposing any proposal
that smacked of concession, many House Republicans saw New Mexico,
especially with a slave code, as unfit for statehood, argued that New Mexicans did not request it, and believed that general southern rejection of
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New Mexico statehood rendered the measure useless in resolving the secession crisis. 24
New Mexico's own congressional delegate, Otero, remained on the sidelines during the debates of January and February 1861. Otero was probably
peeved that the Republicans on the Committee ofThirty-three had ignored
him and interviewed Judge Watts, a political rival with whom he had fought
a bloodless duel in 1859, about New Mexico. Republicans distrusted the
Democrat Otero as strongly proslavery and suspected that he was the principal author of New Mexico's detested slave code. Certainly, Otero's personal
associations in Washington, D.C., were primarily with southern Democrats,
and his wife was a secession-sympathizing belle from South Carolina. But
Otero was no fire-eating disunionist. Although a staunch defender of southern rights, he deplored the prospect of disunion, bloodshed, and civil war.
In a letter to James L. Collins of the Santa Fe Gazette, Otero stated that
Lincoln's election alone was not a just cause for secession. Until Lincoln as
president committed some overt act of aggression against the South, Otero
could "be nothing else than a Union man." He believed that, if disunion
came, the old Union would split into several republics and that New Mexico
should join in a Pacific confederation with California and Oregon based on
their mutual interests. Shunned by the Republican supporters ofNew Mexico
statehood but unsympathetic to the secessionism of his wife and his formerly close southern Democratic friends, Otero mostly relegated himself
to the role of interested observer during the winter crisis 25
Otero did appear, however, to support the New Mexico statehood bill,
albeit rather quietly and indirectly. During House debates, he rose occasionally to parry Republican aspersions that New Mexico and its people
were unfit for statehood. His friend Collins at the Santa Fe Gazette avidly
editorialized in favor of statehood. Otero's most prominent foray into the
statehood debate was a passionate rebuttal of Greeley's New York Tribune
editorial of 31 December against the New Mexico enabling bill. Otero denied Greeley's charges in no uncertain terms- "calumnies," "unscrupulous exaggerations," "utterly, maliciously, and basely false," "grossly
defamatory and shamefully mendacious" -and referred to Greeley himself
in equally harsh terms- "a hard-pressed demagogue," "slanderer," "miserable reviler," "an unscrupulous demagogue and a vile calumniator." President Buchanan's administration, Otero explained, had never used its federal
appointees to push slavery in New Mexico, and army officers on temporary
duty in the territory had not acted as "slave propagandists," although a few
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had brought personal slaves with them. New Mexico's slave code was enacted as a simple act of justice to incoming migrants from southern states.
Unlike Greeley's description, the peonage system was not slavery in different raiment but was "temporary voluntary servitude" in which the worker
contracted to use his labor to payoff a debt. The system denied no peon the
right of suffrage or other civil rights.
As a highly educated native New Mexican, Otero particularly defended
the territory's Hispanic majority. Born in 1829, he had watched, as a teenager, New Mexico pass-smoothly in his mind-from Mexico to the United
States during the U.S.-Mexico War. His people were not, as Greeley and
others charged, a mentally deficient, "hybrid" race of Spanish and Indians.
To the contrary, they were a law-abiding, patriotic people of high moral
character. The territory was no general refuge to criminals exiled from California or Border Ruffians displaced from Kansas. Instead of labeling New
Mexicans as priest-ridden, Otero fumed, Greeley ought to denounce the
many Northern sermons that every week urged Protestant flocks to resist
federal laws requiring all states to return fugitive slaves to their southern
owners. Aside from this letter and brief House interjections, Otero at no
time publicly defended Adams's enabling bill issued from the Committee
of Thirty-three. 26
Otero did participate, however, in defending New Mexico's territorial
integrity against a new threat. Pressured by a year-old gold rush to the central Rocky Mountains and a looming civil war, Congress debated the creation of Colorado Territory, which lay to the north of New Mexico. The
Senate Committee on the Territories, chaired by Democrat James S. Green
of Missouri, devised a bill to organize a territorial government for Colorado, and the Senate amended the bill to lay its southern boundary entirely
along the latitude 37° north, thus adding the northeastern corner or "notch"
of New Mexico to Colorado. The Senate passed the bill on 4 February, and
two days later Democratic senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois tried unSllCcessfully to have the vote reconsidered because the boundary cut slave territory off New Mexico.
When the House took up the Senate bill on 18 February, Otero and a few
others objected to this transfer of the notch and its few thousand inhabitants from New Mexico to Colorado. The short debate was concerned primarily with just how many people might be affected by the transfer and
whether Congress should consult them. Despite objections the House passed
the bill that day by a decisive 90-44 vote. Those members in favor included
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eighty-four Republicans and no Southerners. Of those opposed, only oneCorwin of Ohio-was a Republican, while all the rest were Democrats or
southern Know-Nothings. The Charleston Mercury's Washington, D.C.,
correspondent criticized the Republicans for slicing the notch from New
Mexico to transform it into free soil, but Adams was unhappy with the boundary change, too. Although he voted for the bill, he recorded in his diary,
"The effect is in a degree to confirm the pestiferous notion of a compromise
line on a parallel of latitude, instead of breaking it up as I hoped to do by
admitting New Mexico with an irregular boundary." No such compromise
line, of course, was agreed upon before the session ended. 27
The New Mexico enabling bill lingered in the House until 1 March.
During those final days of the session, the New York Tribune's Greeley and
Ohio's antislavery radical Joshua R. Giddings lobbied fiercely in Washington, D.C., for the Republicans to oppose any compromise. Indeed, their
pressure may have had some effect in defeating the New Mexico bill. The
House voted to table the measure by a vote of 115-71 on 1 March, only two
days before the end of the session and three days before Lincoln's inauguration. Seventy-six Republicans and the sole Northerner still styling himself a
Whig constituted the majority for tabling, but another twenty-four Republicans opposed the motion. Adams, despite his doubt about the bill's value,
was among the latter group. The northern Democrats split 20-9 against
tabling, and three American Party members from the free states also voted
against it. The southern Know-Nothing bloc divided 10-10, with Representative Davis opposed to tabling. Southern Democrats voted 19-14 to table
the bill. Overall, the South split fairly evenly on the motion, in contrast to
earlier reports of how strongly Southerners disliked Adams's bill. Possibly,
by the end of the session, moderate Southerners had come to appreciate the
value of Adams's proposal in settling the territorial slavery issue. B~t they
began embracing the compromise too late to shake loose most Republicans
from their opposition. 28
The New Mexico statehood bill failed in the second session of the Thirtysixth Congress, but the debate over the compromise proposal impacted the
course of the Civil War in one important way. Charles Francis Adams, the
enabling bill's author, expressed satisfaction with and a desire to retain his
seat in the House, despite a rumor that the Lincoln administration would
offer him a cabinet appointment. 29 However, his sponsorship of the New
Mexico bill enkindled so much anger in his Massachusetts district, especially among important political figures like Edward L. Pierce, that his
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chances even for renomination in 1862 were doubtful. This political reality
may have been one factor influencing Adams's decision to accept the post
of U.S. minister to Great Britain, which President Lincoln soon offered
him. Achieving diplomatic renown, Adams played a crucial role in preventing any serious intervention by Great Britain in the war, a move that would
probably have ensured Confederate independence. 3o
New Mexico statehood was a pawn in the Congressional chess game of
last-ditch efforts to achieve a Union-saving compromise during the bleak
secession winter before Lincoln took office. The match ended in a stalemate with no practical resolution of the issues dividing the two sections.
Civil War soon ensued. Despite a Confederate invasion and occupation of
New Mexico in early 1862, most New Mexicans supported the Union, and
the first major action taken by the territorial legislature after the war began
was to repeal the territory's slave code. 3l New Mexico would have to wait for
statehood until 1912.
Notes
1. On the "imaginary Negro" phrase, see James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress:
From Lincoln to Garfield, 2 vols. (Norwich, Conn.: Henry Bill, 1884-1886), 1:272;
and Philadelphia Inquirer, 23 January 1861, 18 February 1861. For some earlier accounts of the New Mexico statehood bill, see Loomis M. Ganaway, New Mexico
and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861, Publications in History, vol. 12, Historical Society of New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1944),
77-84; and Martin Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886 (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1960), 231-55.
2. }<or a discussion of the New Mexico statehood issue from 1846 to 1850, see Mark J.
Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850: Boundary Dispute
and Sectional Crisis (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996).
3- On New Mexican society, economy, and politics, see Howard R. Lamar, The Far
Southwest, 1846-1912: A Territorial History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1966), 83-108; Ralph E. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, 5 vols. (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Torch Press, 1911-1917), 2:146-88, 3°3-25; Ganaway,
New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861, 1-13, 58-76; Robert W.
Larson, New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912 (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1968), 75-84; Larry D. Ball, The United States Marshals ofNew
Mexico and Arizona Territories, 1846-1912 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1978), 18-32; and Jerry Thompson, ed., Texas and New Mexico on the Eve of
the Civil War: The Mansfield and Johnston Inspections, 1859-1861 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 18. On New Mexico's population, see comments of John S. Watts in New York Times, 27 December 1860. Rencher's message

SPRING 2009

STEGMAIER

-+ 285

disallowing the Indian enslavement bill is in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Territory of New Mexico, 10th sess. (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: John T. Russell,
1861),12-13 (hereafter H.R.Journal of N.Mex. Terr.). On legislative proceedings,
see letter signed "New Mexico" and dated 2 December 1860 in St. Louis Daily
Missouri Republican, 25 January 1861. For New Mexico's petition requesting a separate Arizona Territory, see Journal ofthe Council ofthe Legislative Assembly ofNew
Mexico, 9th sess. (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: O. P. Hovey, 1860), 37> 41,133-34 (hereafter
GL.A. Journal of N.Mex. Terr.) in William S. Jenkins, comp., Records ofthe States
of the United States of America: A Microfilm Compilation ([Washington, D.C.]:
Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, 1949), microfilm, New Mexico, A.la,
r. 3. On the moves to divide New Mexico and create a new territory of Arizona, see
the legislative council journal for the ninth session cited above, and Lamar, Far

Southwest, 421-27.
4. "An Act to Provide for the Protections of Property in Slaves in this Territory," Laws

of the Territory of New Mexico: Passed by the Legislative Assembly, Session of 18581859 (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: A. De Marie, 1859), 64-80; and Ganaway, New Mexico
and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861, 60--76.
5. Rep. Charles Francis Adams, a Republican from Massachusetts, acknowledged his
party's dilemma as early as 15 December 1860. See Charles Francis Adams, 15 December 1860, Diary, microfilm, r. 76, part 1, Microfilm ofthe Adams Papers: Owned
by the Adams Manuscript Trust and Deposited in the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1954-1959) (hereafter MAP). Among
the numerous works that cover the secession crisis between Lincoln's election and
inauguration, see David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis; 1848-186], compo and
ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 448-568; Roy F.
Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1948),
371-498; Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, 2 vols. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 195°),2:318-471; Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The

North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 (1950; repr., Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965); Elbert B. Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), 129-90; Daniel W. Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 9°-256; William W. Freehling, The
Road to Disunion, vol. 2, Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 345-516; and Russell McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2008), 60--186.
6. At the session's end, an altered draft of the Corwin Amendment would secure the
approval of two-thirds of both houses and go to the states for ratification. R. Alton
Lee, "The Corwin Amendment in the Secession Crisis," Ohio Historical Quarterly
70 (January 1961): 1-26; Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 1860--1861, 76,
78,195,4°1; and U.S. Senate, Journal of the Committee ofThirteen, 36th Cong., 2d
sess., 1860--1861, S. Rep. 288, serial 1090, 17-18.

286 ~

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 84, NUMBER 2

7. Davis's proposal, offered on 21 December 1860, also included Kansas statehood
and a vote by two-thirds of the House and Senate, with presidential approval, for
any new territorial acquisitions by the United States. U.S. House, Journal of the
Committee ofThirty-Three, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 1860-1861, H. Rep. 3112, serialu04,
13-15. See also Adams, 20-21 December 1860, Diary, r. 76, part 1, MAP; Duberman,
Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, 231-33; Larson, New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912, 83; and McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War, 101-2.
8. Henry Adams, "The Great Secession Winter of 1860-61," in Adams, The Great
Secession Winter of 1860-61 and Other Essays, ed. George Hochfield (New York:
Sagamore Press, 1958), 1{-18; and Dictionary of American Biography, vol. 3, s.v.
"Henry Winter Davis." On Davis's maneuvering, see House, Journal of the Committee ofThirty-Three, H. Rep. 3112, serialu04, 5-6, 10-12, 14-15; Adams, 16-18, 2021 December 1860, Diary, r. 76, part 1, MAP; John T. Graham to Abraham Lincoln,
10 November 1860, and Worthington G. Snethen to Abraham Lincoln, 26 November 1860, 8 December 1860, 21 December 1860, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml!
malhome.html (hereafter Lincoln Papers, LC); Thomas H. Hicks to John J.
Crittenden, 13 December 1860, r. 12, John J. Crittenden Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., microfilm (hereafter Crittenden Papers, LC); and John T. Graham to Charles F. Adams, 15 February 1861, Letters
Received, r. 552, part 4, MAP. Newspaper comment includes Baltimore (Md.)
American and Commercial Advertiser, 8 December 1860, 17 December 1860, 19
December 1860, 2 January 1861,3 January 1861; Baltimore (Md.) Daily Exchange, 8
December 1860, 10 December 1860; Boston Daily Advertiser, 27 December 1860, U
February 1861; Charleston (S.c.) Mercury, U December 1860, 30 January 1861; Cincinnati (Ohio) Daily Enquirer, 12 December 1860; New York Daily Tribune, 3 January 1861; Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 January 1861; and Springfield (Mass.) Daily
. Republican, 28 December 1860. Sherman's proposal is discussed in McClintock,
Lincoln and the Decision for War, 73, 78.
9. Santa Fe (N.Mex.) Gazette, 29 September 1860, 12 January 1861, 19 January 1861.
On 29 September 1860, the Gazette published a letter dated 23 August 1860 originally published in the Alexandria Virginia Sentinel, summarizing an interview with
Otero. The author indicated that Otero would attend a statehood convention upon
returning to New Mexico. In fact, no convention had been called, and Otero probably told the interviewer only that he intended to promote the calling of one.
10.

For the relevant legislative records, see H.R. Journal of N.Mex. Terr., 10th sess., 84,
86,9°; c.L.A. Journal of N.Mex. Terr., 9th sess., 37,41,133-34; and Journal of the
Council ofthe Legislative Assembly ofNew Mexico, 10th Legislative Assembly (Santa
Fe, N.Mex.: John T. Russell, 1860 [1861]), 75, 80-82, 87, 89-90, 92-93, 99, 103,
both in Jenkins, Records ofthe States, New Mexico, A. la, r. 3. The taxation issue is
mentioned in William S. Messervy to Charles F. Adams, 31 December 1860, r. 550,
Letters Received, part 4, MAP; "Shall New Mexico Become a State?" Santa Fe
(N.Mex.) Gazette, 12 January 1861; and letters from Santa Fe in St. Louis Daily
Missouri Republican, 23 January 1861, 21 February 1861. Samuel B. Watrous, writ-

SPRING 2009

STEGMAIER

-+ 287

ing from Barclay's Fort in Mora County, New Mexico, refers cryptically to public
opposition to probable tax increases in the St. Louis Daily Missouri Democrat, 21
February 1861, reprinted in New York Times, 25 February 1861. On New Mexico
statehood, see also Samuel Ellison to Donaciano Vigil, 17 January 1861, William
G. Ritch Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, Cali£.; Charles F.
Adams to Valorous Taft, 16 February 1861, Letterbook, r. 164, part 2, MAP; New York
Daily Tribune, 20 and 28 February 1861; St. Louis Daily Missouri Democrat, 21
February 1861; and Washington (D.G) Evening Star, 21 February 1861.
11. Adams, 24-26 December 1860, Diary, r. 76, part 1, MAP; Henry B. Adams to
C[harles] F. Adams Jr., 22 December 1860, Letters Received, r. 550, part 4, MAP;
Thomas Corwin to Lincoln, 24 December 1860, Lincoln Papers, LC; New York
Times, 27 December 1860; Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, 235-36;
Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861,9°; and Twitchell,

Leading Facts of New Mexican History,

2:310.

12. Adams, 26 December 1860, Diary, r. 76, part 1, MAP; Henry B. Adams to Charles F.
Adams Jr., 26 December 1860, Letters Received, r. 550, part 4, MAP; Duberman,
Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, 236; and McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War, 103.
13· Adams, 27-29 December 1860, Diary, r. 76, part 1, MAP; Adams to Charles F. Adams
Jr., 30 December 1860, Letters Received, r. 550, part 4, MAP; Adams to W. D.
Robinson, 5 January 1861, Letterbook, r. 164, part 2, MAP; House, "Committee of
Thirty-Three Journal," H. Rep. 31, serialn04, 19-21; New York Times, 31 December
1860; and Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886,238-41.
14· Adams to Adams Jr., 30 December 1860, Letters Received, r. 550, part 4, MAP.
15· The letters to Adams on his New Mexico bill are in Letters Received, r. 550 and r. 551,
part 4, MAP. Messervy's letter of 31 December 1860 is in Letters Received, r. 550, part
4, MAP. The letters to and from Sumner are on r. 21 and r. 74, respectively, of the
Papers of Charles Sumner, 18n-1874, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, microfilm (hereafter HL). They include the letter that Garrison wrote on 26 February 1861. See also Wait Talcott to Elihu B. Washburne, 17
February 1861, container 14, Papers ofE. B. Washburne, 1829-1889, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., on New Mexico's possible secession.
Sumner's label, "Ishmaelite," for Adams is quoted in L. Hooper to Nathaniel P. Banks,
1 February 1861, container 13, N. P. Banks Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereafter Banks Papers, Le].
16. Adams Jr. to Adams Sr., 28 December 1860, Adams Jr. to Abigail Brooks Adams, 28
December 1860, and Adams Jr. to Adams Sr., 29 December 1860, Letters Received,
r. 550, part 4, MAP. For Henry B. Adams's correspondence, see Boston Daily Advertiser, 27 December 1860 and 1 January 1861.
17. On Greeley's views and actions regarding New Mexico in 1849-185°, see
Stegmaier, Texas, New Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850 ,23,41-43, 5°,92, 95,
139, 181, 202, 212.
18. For the editorials, see New York Daily Tribune, 31 December 1860,1 January 1861, 5
January 1861, 23 January 1861, 22 February 1861, 25 February 1861, 26 February 1861.

288?

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 84, NUMBER 2

Greeley discusses the use of slaves in mining in the New York Independent, 13
December 1860. Adams concurred with Greeley on the encouragement of slavery
in New Mexico by Democratic administrations during the 185os. Charles F. Adams
to E. C. Banfield, 13 January 1860, Letterbook, r. 164, part 2, MAP.
19· Pierce to Sumner, 31 December 1860,3 January 1861,8 January 1861; and Adams to
Pierce, I January 1861, r. 21, Sumner Papers, HL. A copy of Adams to Pierce, I
January 1861, is also in Letterbook, r. 164, part 2, MAP. On Pierce, see Dictionary of
American Biography, vol. 7, s.v., "Edward Lillie Pierce"; James F. Rhodes, "Memoir of Edward L. Pierce," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 2d
ser., 18 (1905): 363-69; and George F. Hoar, "Edward Lillie Pierce," Proceedings of
the American Antiquarian Society, n. s., 12 (1899): 197-210.
20. Boston Daily Atlas and Bee, 9 January 1861; and Pierce to Sumner, 31 December
1860 and 8 January 1861, r. 21, Sumner Papers, HL. In his article, Pierce suggested that Adams had buckled under pressure from prominent Massachusetts
lawyers, merchants, and officials to compromise. His source was a letter from a
Washington, D.C., correspondent in the Boston Daily Evening Traveller, 3 January 1861. Adams's diary, however, indicates that he intended his plan to show
Republican sympathy for the "honest citizens" of the South, dispel their panic,
and rouse their Union loyalty. See also Adams to Richard Henry Dana Jr., 9
February 1861, box 15, Dana Family Papers, 1654-195°, Massachusetts Historical
Society, Boston. Another comment on the dangers of the New Mexico bill to the
Republican Party and on the measure's potential to facilitate the expansion of
slavery is Rep. Israel Washburn Jr. to Vice President-elect Hannibal Hamlin, 2
January 1861, r. 5, Hannibal Hamlin Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
21. Adams, 8-14 January 1861, Diary, r. 76, part I, MAP; House, Journal ofthe Committee of Thirty-Three, H. Rep. 311z, serial 1104, 35-40; U.S. House, Disturbed Condition ofthe Country, minority report by Rep. Charles Francis Adams, 36th Cong., 2d
sess., 1860-1861, H. Rep. 31/7, serial 1104, 1-3; White to Elihu B. Washburne, 5
January 1861, container 12, Washburne Papers, LC; Child to Sumner, 28 January
1861, r. 21, Sumner Papers, HL; Rives, 9 January 1861, Diary, container 2, Papers of
William C. Rives, 1674-1939, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, 244-46; and
McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War, 118.
22. On Sherman's New Mexico proposal, see Cincinnati (Ohio) Daily Enquirer, 8
January 1861; and New York Times, 7 January 1861.
23. Clay to Abraham Lincoln, 6 February 1861, Lincoln Papers, LC; Clay to John A.
Andrew, 18 February 1861, r. 3, Andrew Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society,
Boston; John A. Gurley to Salmon P. Chase, 24 January 1861, Charles Sumner to
Salmon P. Chase, 24 January 1860, and Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner, 26
January 1861, in The Salmon P. Chase Papers: Microfilm Edition, ed. John Niven
(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), r. 14; Frank W. Ballard
to Charles Sumner, 29 January 1861, r. 21, Sumner Papers, HL; Adams, 23 January
1861, Diary, r. 76, part I, MAP; Boston Daily Atlas and Bee, 29 January 1861; Boston

SPRING 2009

STEGMAIER

~

289

Daily Evening Traveller, 29 January 1861; New York Evening Express, 29 January
1861; New York Commercial Advertiser, 28 January 1861; New York Evening Post
(semi-weekly), 6 February 1861, 9 February 1861; New York Times, 2 February 1861,
13 February 1861; New York World, 26 January 1861; Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 January 1861; and Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, 25 January 1861.
24. Adams's New Mexico remarks are in Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2d sess.,
1860-1861, app. 125-26, and Davis's are in ibid., app. 183. See also Duberman, Charles
Francis Adams, 18°7-1886,249; and McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War,
159. Other Republican views are in Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 18601861,651,697,912, 1O{2, and app. 74-76, 158,219,276,286. Republican denunciations of the New Mexico bill are in ibid., 514-15, 553, 623, 761, 795-96, 968, 972,
973, 977-78, 1007,1010; and app. 83,85, 120, 132-33, 164, 188, 191, 202, 222, 244, 254,
263. Lincoln to Seward, 1 February 1861, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lin-

coln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 8 'loIs. (New Brunswick, N.J:: Rutgers University Press,
1953-1955),4:183. Some Republican newspapers supporting the New Mexico bill
or citing others doing so are Boston Daily Advertiser,

I

February 1861, 20 February

1861,25 February 1861, 1 March 1861; Morning Courier and New York Enquirer, 2
February 1861,19 February 1861; New York Times, 5, 7, 8, 14, 21, 22, 23, 25-28 February 1861, I March 1861; New York World, 1, 6, 8, 13, 28 February 1861; St. Louis Daily

Missouri Democrat, 8 February 1861, 25 February 1861, 1 March 1861; and Springfield (Mass.) Daily Republican, 5 January 1861, 12 January 1861. For Washington,
D.C., correspondents who believed Republicans were shifting to support to Adams's
plan, see Cincinnati (Ohio) Daily Enquirer, 6 February 1861; Louisville (Ky.) Daily

Journal, 29 January 1861,31 January 1861, 9 February 1861; Medina (Ohio) Gazette,
24 January 1861, 14 February 1861; New York Evening Express, 21 Januaw 1861, 5
February 1861; New York National Anti-Slavery Standard, 9 February 1861; New

York Times, 4 February 1861, 27 February 1861; and Springfield Daily Illinois State
Journal, 29 January 1861.
25. Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 1860-1861,455, 515, 623, 761; Santa Fe
(N.Mex.) Gazette, 8 December 1860; Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican
History, 2:310; and Ganaway, New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 18461861, 78-81.

26. Santa Fe (N.Mex.) Gazette, 16 February 1861. Otero's letter was printed in Spanish
in the 23 February issue, which is on r. 2, State Department Territorial Papers, New
Mexico, 1851-1872, National Archives Microfilm Publication M17 (Washington,
D.C.: National Archives, 1954), General Records of the Department of State, Record
Group 59, National Archives. Ganaway discusses the Greeley editorial and Otero
letter in New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846-1861, 81-87.
27· Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 1860-1861, 728-29, 763-66, 1003-5;
Adams, 18 February 1861, Diary, r. 76, part I, MAP; Charleston (S.c.) Mercury, 22
February 1861; and Larson, New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912, 83.
28. Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 2d sess., 1860-1861, 1326-27; and New York Times,
28 February 1861.

290

+

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 84, NUMBER 2

29· On Adams's political situation, see Adams, 27 December 1860, 3 January 1861, 8
January 1861, 23 February 1861, Diary, r. 76, part 1, MAP; Henry Adams to Charles
F. Adams Jr., 2 January 1861, 11 January 1861, Charles F. Adams Jr. to Charles F.
Adams [Sr.], 14 January 1861, Charles F. Adams Jr. to Henry Adams, 16 January
1861, Letters Received, r. 551, part 4, MAP; and Charles F. Adams [Sr.] to Charles F.
Adams Jr., 10 February 1861, Letters Received, r. 552, part 4, MAP. According to
Senator Sumner, had Adams stood for reelection at that time, he could not have
gotten "a corporal's guard" to vote for him. Sumner is quoted in L. Hooper to
Nathaniel P. Banks, 1 February 1861, Banks Papers, LC.
30. On Adams's diplomacy in Great Britain during the Civil War, see Duberman,
Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, 258-333; Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The
Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1992); and Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time: The International
Dimensions of the American Civil War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1999)'
31. "An Act to Repeal 'An Act entitled An Act Providing for the Protection of Slave
Property in this Territory,'" Laws of the Territory of New Mexico, Passed by the Legislative Assembly, Session of1861-1862 (Santa Fe, N.Mex.: Putnam O'Brien, Printer,
1862),6, in Jenkins, Records of the States, New Mexico, B. 2, r. 1.

